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Abstract: We present a framework for understanding and interpreting reciprocity and non-
discrimination, the two principles that are the pillars of the multilateral trading system as
embodied in GATT and its successor, the WTO. We show that GATT's principle of
reciprocity serves to neutralize the world-price effects of a country's trade policy decisions,
and hence can deliver efficient trade-policy outcomes for its member governments provided
that the externalities associated with trade intervention travel through world prices. We
then establish that externalities indeed travel in this way if and only if tariffs also conform
to the principle of non-discrimination (MFN). In this way, the principles of reciprocity and
non-discrimination can work in concert to deliver efficient outcomes for the multilateral
trading system. We also consider within our framework the implications of preferential
agreements for the multilateral trading system. The introduction of free trade agreements
complicates the way in which externalities are transmitted across countries, and in this
environment the principle of reciprocity can no longer deliver efficient multilateral outcomes
for its member governments. We do find, however, a limited place for customs unions in
the multilateral trading system, provided that the member countries of the union have
similar political preferences. As these conditions are quite stringent, we offer little support
for the hypothesis that the principle of reciprocity can deliver an efficient multilateral trade
agreement in the presence of preferential agreements. Instead, our results offer support for
the view that preferential agreements pose a threat to the existing multilateral system.
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I. Introduction
In the preamble to GATT, the governments of the original contracting parties to the
agreement state their specific objectives and the arrangements under GATT that are expected to
contribute to these objectives. The preamble states:l
"Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be conducted with
a view of raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the
production and exchange of goods,
"Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce,
"Have through their Representatives agreed as follows:" (GATT, Preamble).
It is notable that governments do not set forth the goal of free trade; instead, governments
advocate the less ambitious goals of reciprocity (i.e., "reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade") and
non-discrimination (i.e., "the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce"). While the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN) are the pillars
upon which the GATT system is erected, it is also notable that the governments agree in GATT
Article XXIV to grant an important exception to MFN. This article provides conditions under
which countries may form preferentialagreements, which can be established as free trade areas
(in which member countries eliminate their internal barriers to trade) or customs unions (in
which member countries also set common external tariffs).
These observations present four questions to economists studying reciprocal trade
agreements. First, and most fundamentally, what can governments hope to accomplish with
reciprocal trade agreements that they cannot achieve when they set their trade policies
unilaterally? Second, given that free trade is not the stated objective of governments in GATT,
can they nevertheless expect an arrangement that advocates reciprocal tariff liberalization to be
mutually advantageous? Third, are their mutual goals best advanced by an agreement that
eliminates discriminatory treatment? And fourth, once the principle of non-discrimination is
1A similar preamble is included in the WTO, the successor organization to GATT.
adopted, can exceptions to this principle be granted for the creation of preferential agreements
without compromising the performance of the multilateral system?
Our purpose in this paper is to explore these four questions within a unified framework.
We adopt the view that governments enter into reciprocal trade agreements in order to achieve
higher welfare than they would receive were policies set unilaterally. We do not assume,
however, that government welfare is given by national income; instead, we allow that the
government welfare function embodies both "economic" (i.e., national income) and "political"
(i.e., distributional) considerations. Of course, a trade agreement can offer higher welfare for
its participants only if an inefficiency arises when trade policies are set unilaterally. We thus
begin by identifying the key inefficiency that accounts for the appeal of a reciprocal trade
agreement. This provides a foundation from which to next assess GATT as an institution that is
designed to facilitate the implementation of more efficient trade outcomes. In particular, we
evaluate whether three of GATT's central features - reciprocity, non-discrimination (MFN) and
the exception to MFN associated with the formation of preferential agreements - serve well as
principles that guide participating governments to efficient outcomes.
We begin, then, with the first question identified above: Why do governments negotiate
reciprocal trade agreements? A popular view is that such agreements are attractive to
governments as a means to achieve political objectives. While actual governments clearly have
political motivations, it is important to emphasize that this by itself provides no reason for
governments to seek reciprocal trade agreements. The possibility of mutual gains from such
agreements requires something more: the unilateral trade policy decisions of each government,
when viewed together, must be inefficient in light of the governments' own preferences. In the
leading political-economy models of trade, the introduction of politics affects the preferences of
governments - for example, politically motivated governments may not aspire to free trade - but
does not generate an externality across governments. As such, politics can affect the trade-
policy objectives that governments have, but it does not explain why governments need a
reciprocal trade agreement in order to achieve these objectives.
An alternative view is that governments enter into reciprocal trade agreements in order to
escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma. When a government imposes an
import tariff, it lowers the world price and harms foreign exporters; as a consequence of this
terms-of-trade externality, governments' unilateral trade policies restrict trade more than is
efficient. A reciprocal trade agreement can then be appealing to governments as a means to
"undo" the restrictions in trade associated with the terms-of-trade externality, so that more
efficient trade volumes can by achieved. This view has a long history, dating back to Torrens
(1844), Mill (1844), Scitovsky (1942) and Johnson (1953-54), who developed their arguments
in the context of national-income maximizing governments that exploited their monopoly power
in international markets with "optimal tariffs."2 While the terms-of-trade view is logically
unassailable, many economists are skeptical of its practical relevance: a common position is that
this argument becomes secondary in explaining the appeal of reciprocal trade agreements once
more realistic government objectives that include political concerns are acknowledged.
To answer our first question, we therefore construct a model in which governments are
motivated by both political and terms-of-trade considerations. We show that more general
government objectives do not overturn the view that trade agreements provide governments
with an escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma. Moreover, in the leading
formulations of political economy, and indeed whenever government objectives can be
represented as a function of national prices and the terms of trade, this is all that trade
agreements do: political considerations play no role in explaining why governments seek
reciprocal trade agreements. While political considerations surely affect the trade objectives that
governments seek to achieve, it is the terms-of-trade externality that creates an inefficiency
when policies are set unilaterally and that therefore explains why governments need a reciprocal
trade agreement in order to accomplish their objectives.3
Having identified the inefficiency that reciprocal trade agreements are designed to
eliminate, we turn next to the second question raised above: Why would it be mutually
advantageous to form an agreement that calls for reciprocal tariff liberalization? At a general
level, the answer to this question follows naturally from the answer to the first question: terms-
of-trade externalities lead governments to restrict trade more than is efficient, and so an
efficiency-enhancing trade agreement naturally involves reciprocal tariff liberalization. We push
this idea much further, however, and examine the actual representation of reciprocity found in
GATT. Our framework provides a logic to this representation provided that, among those tariff
2More recently, this view has been explored in papers by Dixit (1987) and McMillan (1986, 1989).
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 Political considerations might give rise to a separate motivation for reciprocal trade agreements if governments
seek such agreements to gain commitment relative to their private sectors. This possibility is explored by
Maggi and Rodriguez (1996) and Staiger (1995). It has not yet been demonstrated, however, that this hypothesis
accounts for the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination that form the pillars of GATT.
combinations that achieve efficiency, governments seek through GATT to implement the tariffs
that remain when terms-of-trade motivations are eliminated from each government's unilateral
trade policy choices. In particular, we establish that an efficient trade agreement can be
implemented under reciprocity only if the agreement is characterized by such tariffs.
We consider next the third question raised above: Is there an efficiency rationale for the
principle of non-discrimination (MFN)? We find that a multilateral system built on the
principle of reciprocity can implement an efficient agreement only if it also embraces the
principle of non-discrimination. Hence, our framework provides a formal rationale for the
linkage between the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination as pillars of an efficient
multilateral trading system. In essence, reciprocity and non-discrimination serve as principles
that work together to deliver an efficient trade-policy outcome by eliminating the restrictions in
trade that are associated with terms-of-trade motivations. To our knowledge, this result
represents the first efficiency rationale for the principle of non-discrimination.
Finally, we consider the possibility of preferential agreements and re-phrase our fourth
question in the more specific form: Can a multilateral system that relies on the principle of
reciprocity to determine external tariffs implement an efficient agreement in the presence of free-
trade agreements or customs unions? We find that the principle of reciprocity cannot serve to
implement an efficient agreement when free trade areas are present. On the other hand,
reciprocity may implement an efficient agreement in the presence of a customs union, but only if
the union is comprised of similar countries (i.e., "natural integration partners"). These
conditions are quite stringent, and so we offer only limited support for the hypothesis that the
principle of reciprocity can deliver an efficient trade agreement in the presence of preferential
trade agreements. Instead, our results offer support for the view that preferential agreements
pose a threat to the existing multilateral system.
The intuition for our central conclusions derives from three basic insights. First, we
establish that an efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under GATT's
principle of reciprocity provided that the externalities associated with trade intervention are
transmitted only through world price movements. Second, we show that externalities indeed
are transmitted only through world price movements when tariffs conform to MFN. Thus, the
principles of reciprocity and MFN work hand-in-hand to facilitate the implementation of
efficient trade arrangements. Finally, when tariffs are discriminatory, we find that externalities
travel through both world and local prices. For a given aggregate volume of trade, an importing
government that selects discriminatory tariffs prefers that a greater share of the import volume
come from the foreign export partner on whom it places the highest tariff. Since foreign export
volumes are in turn determined by foreign local prices, it follows that local prices transmit
externalities as well when tariffs are discriminatory. Discriminatory tariffs, such as arise when
countries form preferential agreements, thus tend to undermine reciprocity as a principle with
which to implement efficient trade policies.4
To develop these points, we construct a simple model of trade between countries. In
particular, we model trade in a partial-equilibrium framework, and we derive some of our more
specific findings under the assumption that demand and supply functions take linear forms.
The central conclusions of our analysis, however, are quite general.5 We present our ideas in a
simple model for two main reasons. First, the partial-equilibrium setting enables us to give a
concrete interpretation of the respective roles of political and terms-of-trade motivations in the
determination of trade policy. Second, working with this simple structure, we are able to obtain
closed-form solutions for trade-policy choices, and this makes it possible to report as well some
more specific findings. For example, we show that governments will subsidize exports, if the
parameters associated with political motivations are large in magnitude.6
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We present in Section II a model of
trade between two countries. Here we identify the inefficiency associated with unilateral tariff
setting that a reciprocal trade agreement can correct. In Section III, we define the principle of
reciprocity and explore the sense in which this principle promotes efficient outcomes. Section
IV extends our analysis to a many-country framework. In Section V, we make use of this
extended framework and present our main results regarding the efficiency relationships between
reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements. Section VI concludes.
4The only form of tariff discrimination that can be excepted from this statement amounts to the case where
previously independent countries join together in complete political and economic union to become a "single
country" for the purposes of trade policy.
5For example, we show in a separate paper (Bagwell and Staiger, 1996a) that our answer to the first question
given above is very general: it holds for a general-equilibrium model of trade, provided only that government
preferences can be represented as general functions of local and world prices. The present paper develops this
point in a model for which political motivations can be given a concrete interpretation. In addition, we offer
here answers to the other three questions mentioned above.
6As is usual, the partial-equilibrium analysis can be re-interpreted as a general-equilibrium model, if an additional
numeraire good is included that consumers value in a quasi-linear fashion. With this modification, our modeling
approach parallels the approach commonly developed in general-equilibrium models of trade policy (see, e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In the text, we develop this general-equilibrium interpretation of our analysis in
a sequence of footnotes.
II. Reciprocal Trade Agreements in a Two-Country Framework
In this section, we develop a simple two-country partial-equilibrium model. This model
allows us to explore the notion of reciprocity without the need to consider the topic of non-
discrimination. The latter issue is addressed in the many-country model of Sections IV and V.
A . Model
We consider a world economy in which two countries - home (no *) and foreign (*) -
trade two goods JC and y, with JC (y) the natural import good of the home (foreign) country. In
this subsection, we construct a simple model, characterize the market-clearing values for prices
and quantities, and then express government objectives in terms of these values.
Basic Assumptions: We assume that each of the two goods is demanded in each
country according to a symmetric demand function, D. Letting px and py denote the local prices
of good JC and y in the domestic market, the domestic demand function for good i = {x,y} is
represented by the decreasing function D(pi). Foreign demand functions are symmetrically
represented in terms of the foreign local prices, p* and py. Each good is also produced in each
country, and we allow that countries have different skills in this regard so that a basis for trade
exists. The respective supply functions derive from competitive markets, and the domestic
supply functions are represented by the increasing functions, Qx(Px) ai*d Qy(Py)- Similarly, the
foreign supply functions are increasing and given as Qx(Px) and Qy(py). Consistent with the
hypothesis that the domestic country is the natural importer of good x, we assume that Qx(p) =
Qy(p) < Qy(p) = Q*(p)- Finally, the associated domestic and foreign profit functions are
represented with the increasing functions, Tlx(px), ny(py), li(px) and it^(py).
While these basic assumptions underlie the broad themes developed below, further
insights can be gained when the functional forms are given additional structure. To this end,
we assume that the demand and supply functions take simple linear forms: D(pO = 1 - pu
Qx(Px) = Px/2, Qy(Py) = Py, Qx(pl) = Px, and Qy(py) = pp2. The profit functions are then
given by Ux(px) = (px?/4, ny(py) = (py)2/2, lfx(p*x) = (ptf/2 and
7The domestic functions derive from production functions of the form Qx = (Lxf12 and Qy = (2Ly)1/2, where
Lx (Ly) is the labor used in the production of good x (y), under the assumption that labor supply is infinitely
elastic at a unitary wage. Similar remarks apply for the foreign functions. The partial-equilibrium model can be
closed with the addition of a traded numeraire good z, where the utility of a representative agent is given by U =
Cz + (Cx-Cx/2) + (Cy-Cy/2) with Cz and Q denoting consumption of the numeraire good z and good i = {x,y}.
If z is sufficiently abundant in each country so that it is always consumed in positive amounts by each agent, the
7Price Determination: To describe the determination of market prices, we first introduce
some notation for tariffs. Let xx denote the (specific) import tariff applied by the domestic
government to imports of good x, and let Xy represent the (specific) export subsidy given by the
domestic country to exports of good v. In similar fashion, we represent the foreign country's
import tariff as Xy and export subsidy as xx.
Provided trade taxes do not prohibit all trade, local prices in each country must obey
arbitrage and market-clearing conditions. These conditions are given respectively as follows:
QiiPi) + Q*i(P*i) = D(pt) + D(p*), i = x, v.
These two sets of equations yield market-clearing domestic prices, px(xx-xx) and py(Xy*-Xy), as
well as the associated foreign prices, px(^x-^x) and Py(xy-Xy). The market-clearing local prices
depend upon trade policy only through the associated net tariffs, xx-xx and Xy*-xy. Given that
demand (supply) functions are downward (upward) sloping, it is direct to confirm that a higher
net tariff raises (lowers) the local price in the importing (exporting) country.
Consider next the world (i.e., offshore) prices. Letting p™ and py denote the world
price of goods x and y, respectively, we have the following definition: pi = p™ + T/, i = x, y.
Having already solved for the market-clearing local prices, we may thus represent the market-
clearing world prices as p%(xXi xx) and py(Xy, Xy). Using the monotonicity of the demand and
supply functions, it is direct to confirm that the world price is decreasing in each argument: The
world price falls when the import tariff is raised and when the export subsidy is increased.8
Finally, it is convenient to express market-clearing local prices as explicit functions of world
prices: pi(xi,pWi(xi,x\)) = p^(xi,x*) + xtandp*(x*,p1[(xi,x\)) = pWi(xux*) + x*.
Trade Volumes: We consider next the market-clearing import and export volumes. The
domestic import volume for good JC is denoted by M(px) = D(px) - Qx(Px), and the domestic
export volume of good y is represented by E(py) = Qy(py) - D(py). Using the linear structure of
the model, it is straightforward to derive conditions under which the trade volume is positive:
marginal utility of income will be fixed at one and partial-equilibrium analysis of the two non-numeraire sectors
is appropriate. Trade in the numeraire good is then determined by the requirement of overall trade balance.
8Formally, the world price function takes the form P^(TX,TX) = [4-4TX-3TX]/7 andpy(Ty,Ty) = [4-4Ty-3Ty]/7.
The closed-form solutions for the market-clearing local prices now can be directly derived.
8(1). M(px) > 0 iffrx-rx < 1/6; E(py) > 0 iff^-Ty < 1/6.
Thus, trade occurs so long as the net tariff is not too large. Foreign import and export volumes,
M*(Py) and E*(px), are defined symmetrically, with M(px) = E*(px) and M*(py) = E(py) then
following directly from the market-clearing requirement.
Government Objectives: We are now prepared to define government welfare functions.
Governments are assumed to maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus
and tariff revenue. Following Baldwin (1987), we allow for political-economy influences with
the assumption that governments may weigh producer surplus differently than consumer
surplus and tariff revenue. This representation has recently been given micro-analytic
foundations in the explicit lobbying model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994).9
Let Ym ^  1 (Ye ^  1) denote the weight that the government attaches to the producer
surplus earned by import-competing (exporting) firms. The welfare that the domestic
government experiences on its import and export goods is then defined as follows:
1




Wy(Py,Py) = fD(py)dpy + %J7y(/7y,) - fpy - p^JE(Py).
Py
The domestic-government welfare function is then the sum of the welfare achieved on the
import good and the export good: W(px,py,p^,p^) = Wx(px,pJ) + Wy(py,p^).10 The foreign-
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so that W*(px,py,p^,p^) = Wy(py,py) + W^(px,p^) defines the foreign welfare function.
9In Grossman and Helpman (1994), governments behave as if they place greater weight on the producer surplus
of politically represented sectors provided that these sectors compose a small fraction of the overall economy.
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 °In the general equilibrium interpretation of our model presented in footnote 7, the tariff-revenue term in the
welfare functions corresponds to consumer surplus arising from the consumption of the numeraire good, z.
B . Nash Equilibria
In this subsection, we consider a static tariff game, in which the domestic government
unilaterally selects its tariff policy, (TX, Xy), in order to maximize its welfare, W, at the same time
that the foreign government unilaterally chooses its tariff policy, (%y, xx), in order to maximize
its welfare, W . Our purpose is to characterize the Nash tariff policies, paying particular
attention to the relation between Nash policies and the political-economy parameters.
We begin with a general characterization of the best-response tariff policies. To this
end, we define the parameters,
Xy = [dp™ I dry] I [dpy / dxy] = [dp™ I dXxl I [dpx /d%x] = Ax>
and then maximize W with respect to (xx, Xy) and W* with respect to (Ty, xx). We find that the
best-response tariffs for the domestic and foreign governments are defined implicitly by
(2). Home: W$> +XxWnw = O--
rX Px
Foreign: W&* + Xy Wpw = 0 = W&* + hx Wpw.
The best-response tariffs are thus determined by the combined impact that the implied local and
world price movements have on welfare.
A general interpretation can be offered with reference to Figure 1. Let A = {XX,TX)
represent an initial tariff pair for good x. This pair is associated with a domestic iso-local-price
line (i.e., an iso-net-tariff line), denoted as L(A)—>IJ(A), and an iso-world-price line, given as
px(A)—>px(A). The iso-local-price line is linear with a slope of unity, since the net tariff is held
constant when an increase in the import tariff is matched by an equal increase in the export
subsidy; on the other hand, the iso-world-price line slopes downward, because the world price
can be held constant only if an increase in the export subsidy is balanced against a decrease in
the import tariff. For a fixed T*, when rx is increased to T£, a new point C = (T?X, TX) is induced.
This point lies on new iso-price lines, represented as v(C)->i(C) and py£(C)->px'(C), and the
local (world) price is now higher (lower) than it was originally at A.
As (2) suggests, the overall movement from A to C can be disentangled into separate
movements in the world and local prices, respectively. The movement from A to B captures the
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induced reduction in the world price, holding fixed the local price, and the welfare implications
of this change for the domestic government are associated in (2) with the term WJ*. Similarly,
the movement from B to C isolates the local price change, with the corresponding welfare
change for the domestic government captured in (2) with the term Wpx. The world-price
movement from A to B illustrates the cost-shifting inefficiency that arises when policies are set
unilaterally. If the domestic government aspires to a local price corresponding to the iso-local-
price line v(C)—>i(C), then a unilateral increase in the domestic import tariff passes some of the
costs of this outcome to the foreign government, whose exports are sold at a lower world price.
We now exploit the specific structure of the model and offer further interpretation of the
best-response tariffs. Best-response tariffs are determined by two forces: the impact of tariffs
on world prices (the terms of trade) and the impact of tariffs on local prices. It is through the
terms-of-trade effect associated with world price movements that a country can redistribute
surplus from its trading partner to itself. As we demonstrate below, the local-price effect can be
further disentangled into two component effects: a political-economy effect and an efficiency
effect. The political-economy effect refers to the ability of trade policy to alter the local price
and redistribute surplus between domestic producers and domestic consumers or tariff revenue,
holding the volume of trade fixed. Trade policies also have an efficiency effect through their
impact on local prices, as these local price changes alter the volume of trade and thereby affect
welfare. We establish below that the terms-of-trade effect leads governments to restrict trade
more than if each were motivated only by local price considerations.
To make these points, we note that the best-response condition (2) for the home
government may be re-written as:
(3a). {Qx(px)[ym -1] + rx[dMd^x]} + [3M(f>x)/4] = 0
(3b). {Qy(Py)[Ye-U - TyfdE/dpy]} + [-4E(Py)/3] = 0,
where we use the fact that kx = -3/4 and ky = -4/3. The home import and export policies are
optimal under (3a) and (3b), respectively. Similar conditions apply for the foreign government.
The terms in curly brackets on the LHS of (3a) correspond to W* in (2) and represent
the local-price effect of a small increase in the domestic import tariff, rx. The first term,
Qx(Px)fYm -1], measures the net effect on consumer surplus and import-competing producer
surplus when the fixed Qx(px ) units of domestically produced and consumed x are exchanged
11
domestically at a higher price.11 This political-economy effect is positive when the implied
redistribution is desirable (i.e., when ym > 1). The second term, %x[dMldpx], is negative and
captures the efficiency effect. It gives the efficiency cost to the domestic country when its
import tariff is raised slightly, thereby inducing import volume (and tariff revenue) to fall.
Finally, the last term on the LHS of (3a), given by (3/4)M(px), is positive and corresponds to
kxWpy in (2). It represents the increase in tariff revenue collected on the M(px) units of
imported x attributable to the reduction in the world price that follows a slight increase in the
import tariff; this is the terms-of-trade effect, and it reflects a redistribution of surplus from
foreign exporters to the domestic country, the effect of which is to lower the cost to the
domestic government of providing additional protection to its import-competing producers.
Condition (3b) admits a similar interpretation, except that the terms-of-trade effect associated
with a small increase in the export subsidy now redistributes surplus from the home to the
foreign country, the effect of which is to raise the cost to the domestic government of providing
additional help to its export interests.
Letting T§(TX) and iy(Ty) denote the home government's import-tariff and export-
subsidy best-response (i.e., reaction) curves, we next solve (3a) and (3b) to find that
5] +2"&[13-4ym] * * = 4[3Y
4[17-2YmJ ' ^ ^ 3[25-3YeJ
The second-order conditions are satisfied if the political-economy weights are not too large, and
so we assume that ym E [1,3] and ye E [1,3].12 The foreign-government import-tariff and
export-subsidy reaction functions, Ty(ty) and TX(TX), can be expressed analogously.
We next determine the import tariffs and export subsidies at which the reaction curves
intersect. Given the symmetry across countries and products, such a Nash equilibrium will be
described by a Nash import tariff, T$ = x^ = T*£, and a Nash export subsidy, x£ = T^ = T*^.
Solving, we find that the import-tariff and export-subsidy reaction curves agree if and only if
11The given M(px) units of imports also trade at a higher local price; however, the associated gain to total
revenue is exactly offset by the corresponding loss to consumer surplus.
12The reaction curves are upward sloping. Intuitively, when the foreign export subsidy increases, the domestic
country experiences a rise in imports (i.e., M(px) increases) and a fall in domestic production (i.e., Qx(Px)
decreases). The former (latter) change magnifies (weakens) the terms-of-trade (political-economy) gain that is
associated with a higher import tariff. Our finding that the best-response functions are increasing indicates that
the magnification of the terms-of-trade effect dominates the weakening of the political-economy effect.
12
^ _ 104ym+51ye -24YmYe -113 ^ _123Ye + 56Ym -24YmYe -179
6[101-8Ym-9Ye] ' e 6[101-8Ym-9Ye]
Applying the conditions for prohibitive trade taxes recorded in (1) above, a positive trade
volume occurs at the Nash tariffs if and only if 1/6 > T J^ - T^, which in turn is true if and only if
(5). 5/8 + 9Y(J8>Ym.
Thus, provided that the political significance of the import sector is not too large relative to that
of the export sector, a Nash equilibrium with positive trade volume exists. Henceforth, we
assume that (5) is satisfied. Figure 2 illustrates the Nash equilibrium and the reaction curves.
It is of interest to know whether the Nash import tariff and export subsidy are positive.
We begin with the Nash import tariff. It is a simple matter to confirm that this tariff is positive
over the relevant range of parameters, since it is in fact positive over an even larger set:
(6). T$ > Ofor all
 Ym E[1,3]and Ye E[1,3].
Without political-economy effects (i.e., when
 Ym =Ye = 7), a government finds a slight import
tariff desirable, since the first-order terms-of-trade benefit outweighs the second-order
efficiency cost of a reduction in import volume. A reinforcing effect arises when political
economy is present, as the political-economy effect associated with the redistribution of surplus
to import-competing firms advances the case for an import tariff further.
The situation is more ambiguous with respect to the Nash export subsidy. We find that
(7). i%>OiffYm> [1253-861Ye]/[56(7-3Ye)].
To interpret this condition, consider the case in which the political-economy effect is absent. In
this case, the condition in (7) is violated, and the standard prescription of an export tax emerges:
a slight export tariff offers a first-order benefit that is associated with the terms-of-trade effect,
while the efficiency cost of reduced trade volume is second order for a small export tariff.
When political-economy effects are included, however, the attractiveness of an export tariff is
reduced, since an additional political-economy cost is experienced, as surplus is redistributed
from domestic exporters to domestic consumers and tariff revenue. When political-economy
13
influences are sufficiently pronounced, a slight export tariff is no longer desirable. In fact, the
Nash equilibrium then entails an export subsidy.13
These conclusions are illustrated in Figure 3. The upward-sloping line represents (5)
and gives parameter combinations above which the Nash equilibrium net tariff exceeds the
critical value of 1/6; for this range of parameters, a Nash equilibrium with positive trade volume
does not exist. The export-subsidy inequality given in (7) is represented by the downward-
sloping line. The Nash export subsidy is positive if the political-economy weights, ym and ye,
are sufficiently large. The Nash import tariff is positive throughout the parameter space.
Finally, we return to Figure 2 and explore the possibility of autarky Nash equilibria.
The dotted line is a "no-trade" line, along which the net tariff achieves the critical value of 1/6.
It is now easy to argue that all tariff/subsidy combinations to the northwest of the point AB
represent autarky equilibria. To see this, suppose that the trade-policy choices in good x place
the countries in this region, and consider the options available to the domestic government.
Holding fixed the foreign-country export policy, if the domestic government is to deviate and
induce a positive volume of trade, then it must cut its import tariff substantially and create a net
tariff that lies below the no-trade line. But such an outcome is worse for the domestic
government than is point A, which itself gives the autarky outcome.14 Thus, the domestic
government cannot benefit by deviating, and the autarky trade policy is an equilibrium policy.
We summarize our specific findings with the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the static tariff game:
(i). There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive trade volume.
(ii). In the Nash equilibrium with positive trade volume, the Nash import tariff is positive,
but the Nash export subsidy is positive if and only if the political-economy parameters
are sufficiently large in magnitude.
(Hi). There also exist a continuum of autarky Nash equilibria.
C. Reciprocal Trade Agreements
In this subsection, we characterize the reciprocal trade agreement that is efficient from
the governments' perspective, and we show that the Nash equilibrium is inefficient. We then
13Grossman and Helpman (1995) also note that an export subsidy is possible in a Nash equilibrium when the
export sector has significant political power.
14It can be shown that welfare for a government declines along its reaction curve as the policy of its trading
partner becomes more restrictive.
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define politically optimal tariffs as the tariffs that would be chosen by governments were they
not motivated by their ability to affect the terms of trade. We find that a reciprocal trade
agreement that implements such tariffs is efficient. Finally, we exploit the specific structure of
our model in order to gain more insight into the role of political-economy parameters in the
determination of the various tariff policies.
An efficient trade agreement calls for trade policies that maximize joint welfare, W+ W*.
A first observation is that joint welfare is a function only of the net tariff levels. To see this,
notice from the definitions of W and W* that their sum is independent of world prices (since
market clearing requires that M(px) = E*(px) and E(py) = M*(py)). Intuitively, a change in
world prices holding fixed local prices simply redistributes income across countries, and in our
partial-equilibrium setting such a redistribution does not affect joint welfare, since the marginal
utility of income for each country is fixed at unity. It follows that only local prices matter for
efficiency. But, as we have seen, local prices depend only upon the net trade impediments in
each sector, and so joint welfare is entirely determined by net tariffs.
Given the symmetry between sectors x and y, the efficient net tariff for market JC will be
the same as that for market y. Consequently, we may define i = xx-%x = Ty-Ty and characterize
the efficient level of the net trade impediment, i. Letting J(i) = W+ W* denote joint welfare, and
noting that the second-order condition, J"(i) < 0, holds generally under our parameter
restrictions, the first-order condition that T(i) = 0 defines the efficient trade agreement, iE. This
first-order condition for efficiency can be written as
(8). fei
Condition (8) may be contrasted with those in (2) that describe the Nash equilibrium policies.
Observe in particular that terms-of-trade effects are relevant for governments when setting their
Nash policies, but terms-of-trade effects are not relevant for governments when setting efficient
trade policies. This discrepancy indicates that Nash tariffs are not efficient.
We consider next politically optimal tariffs. These are the tariffs that governments
would choose were they not motivated by the terms-of-trade consequences of their choices.
Formally, politically optimal tariffs are defined as tariffs that satisfy
(9). W OW W
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It is immediate from a comparison of (2), (8) and (9) that politically optimal tariffs are efficient
and that these efficient tariffs will be attained if the terms-of-trade motivations from each
government's Nash trade policy choices are eliminated.
A general perspective on these observations is possible with reference to Figure 1. If
the domestic government seeks to achieve a local price that corresponds to the iso-local-price
line L(C)-^IJ(C), then the attainment of this price involves no world price externality when the
domestic government's higher import tariff is balanced against a lower export subsidy, so that
the world price is not altered. This corresponds to the movement from A to D. When the
domestic government is not motivated by the terms-of-trade implications of its tariff policy, it
prefers choosing a higher tariff and inducing point C instead of selecting a lower tariff and
inducing point A if and only if it also prefers point D to point A. If both governments choose
tariffs in this fashion, then a resulting consistent set of tariffs is politically optimal. In this case,
the tariffs that governments select are not influenced by cost-shifting motivations, and so
politically optimal tariffs are efficient.15
On the other hand, when the domestic government chooses its import tariff mindful of
the terms-of-trade externality associated with movements in the world price (i.e., the movement
from A to B), then it recognizes that some of the costs of achieving the higher domestic local
price are shifted to the foreign government through the resulting reduction in the world price.
As a consequence, the domestic government can be expected to choose higher import tariffs
(i.e., restrict trade more) than is jointly efficient. This explains why Nash trade policies are
always inefficient, with trade volumes that are too low. The broad conclusion that thus emerges
is that an inefficiency arises when governments set trade policies unilaterally if and only if they
are motivated by terms-of-trade considerations.
To confirm and extend these observations, we now exploit the specific structure of our
model. We begin with politically optimal trade policies. Imposing symmetry and solving (9)
for an import tariff and export subsidy, T ^ and T ^ , that generate the local prices for each good
that each government would prefer once terms-of-trade motivations have been eliminated, we
find that
15While a willingness to move from point A to point D in Rgure 1 induces no externality through the terms of
trade, it will involve a change in the foreign local price; however, if the foreign government also selects tariffs
that are politically optimal, then a small change in the foreign local price will not alter the foreign welfare in a
first-order sense.
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Observe that the politically optimal trade policy calls for free trade when political-economy
influences are absent. Otherwise, the politically optimal trade policy involves an import tariff
and an export subsidy.
We consider next the net tariffs. The efficient net tariff solves (8), and it is given by iE
= 4[2ym-3ye+l]/ [59-8ym-9ye]. Next, using (4), the Nash net tariff, iN = x% - T£, can be
written as iN = [8ym-12ye+JlJ/ [101-8ym-9ye]. As expected, when political-economy effects
are absent, the efficient net tariff corresponds to free trade and the Nash net tariff is positive.
We may define the politically optimal net tariff as i™ = T£° - if3®. The politically optimal net
tariff is indeed efficient, as it follows easily that ipo = iE. Finally, using (5) it can be shown that
[101-8ym-9ye] [59-8ym-9ye]
Thus, whether or not political-economy effects are present, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient,
and the inefficiency always takes the form of a trade volume that is too low.16
The central findings of this subsection are summarized as follows:
Proposition 2: In the static tariff game:
(i). The politically optimal import tariff and export subsidy are non-negative.
(ii). The politically-optimal trade policy is efficient.
(Hi). The Nash trade policy is not efficient, as the net Nash tariff is too high and the Nash
trading volume is too low.
III. Reciprocity
At this point, we have constructed a framework that reveals several specific insights
regarding trade policy and that also delivers an answer to our first question. In particular, we
find that governments can mutually gain from a reciprocal trade agreement if and only if their
16It is interesting to note that d[i -L )/dym < 0 < d(i -i )/dye. Hence, while trade liberalization under an
efficient trade agreement simply eliminates the terms-of-trade driven restrictions that arise in the absence of such
an agreement, the magnitude of this liberalization is smaller (greater) as the political weight placed by
governments on import interests (export interests) is larger. This reflects the fact that a larger political weight
on import interests (export interests) results in a lower (higher) trade volume in the Nash equilibrium, and thus a
diminished (expanded) role for terms-of-trade considerations in the Nash trade policy choices.
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unilateral trade policies are motivated by their ability to affect the terms of trade. We now turn
to our second question and explore the sense in which a reciprocal trade agreement that is
founded on the principle of reciprocity can guide governments from their inefficient unilateral
policies to the efficiency frontier.
To begin, it is useful to remark that the principle of reciprocity has (at least) two
meanings. At a general level, the principle refers to the "balance of concessions" that
governments seek when they enter into trade negotiations. As Dam (1970, p. 59) explains, the
language of Article XXVIII bis, under which the rounds of GATT tariff negotiations occur,
makes it clear that participation in these negotiations is to be voluntary, that negotiations are to
be carried out "on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis," and that they are to be
"conducted on a basis which affords adequate opportunity to take into account...the needs of
individual contracting parties and individual industries...and...all other relevant circumstances
including fiscal, developmental, strategic and other needs of the contracting parties concerned."
Dam continues:
"This permissive approach to the content of tariff agreements is often referred to under the
heading of reciprocity. From the formal legal principle that a country need make
concessions only when other contracting parties offer reciprocal concessions considered to
be ^mutually advantageous1 has been derived the informal principle that exchanges of
concessions must entail reciprocity." (Dam, 1970, p. 59)
As is evident from Dam's discussion, there is nothing in GATT which requires that the outcome
of negotiations produce a balance of concessions. Indeed, the notion of a balance of
concessions is no where defined in GATT. This general principle of reciprocity describes
instead the broad manner in which governments seem to approach trade agreements.
On the other hand, under Article XXVIII, GATT provides for countries to renegotiate
tariff commitments made initially under Article XXVIII bis, and it is when countries fail to
come to agreement under these renegotiations that GATT imposes the requirement of reciprocity
on the resulting tariff changes. In particular, if a country withdraws a tariff concession to
which it had committed in a previous round of tariff negotiations, its trading partners are then
authorized to withdraw "substantially equivalent concessions." We develop more fully and
analyze these two notions of reciprocity below.
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A. General Meaning
We start with the general notion of reciprocity. In light of the balance of concessions
that governments seek in the name of reciprocity it is widely held that enthusiasm for reciprocal
trade agreements is a practice rooted in a mercantilist perspective. For example, Krugman
(1991, p.25) observes:
To make sense of international trade negotiations, one needs to remember three simple rules
about the objectives of the negotiating countries:
1). Exports are good.
2). Imports are bad.
3). Other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good.
In other words, GATT-think is enlightened mercantilism.
Our first task is to establish that the mercantilist approach to reciprocal trade liberalization that
seems to drive actual negotiations can be explained within our framework.
To make this point, we must formalize what is meant by a balance of concessions. As
mentioned, this general notion, which is embodied in Krugman's third rule and which
Bhagwati (1991) calls "first-difference reciprocity," is not defined in GATT, but we will say
that a proposed set of reciprocal tariff reductions constitutes a balance of concessions provided
that, when valued at existing world prices, the proposed set of tariff reductions together bring
about equal increases in the volume of each country's imports and exports.17 Within the
context of our model, we find that a proposed set of tariffs {T£, ti, T*J, TJ) will achieve a
balance of concessions relative to an existing set of tariffs {T%, iy, %£, T*y0} provided that18
where we now simplify our notation and express import volumes directly as functions of net
tariffs. By inspection of the welfare functions, it can be seen that this condition is satisfied by
any set of tariff reductions that (i). leaves world prices unchanged, or (ii). alters world prices
17See Dam (1970, pp. 58-61) for a discussion and interpretation of the notion of reciprocity that appears in
GATT negotiation rounds and that is broadly consistent with our approach.
18Referring to the general-equilibrium interpretation of our model described in footnote 7, we define reciprocity
as the condition:
y ty y
where Mz denotes domestic-country imports of the numeraire good z. We utilize the requirement of balanced
trade at the existing set of world prices to eliminate all existing trade volumes (i.e., the trade volumes at the
existing set of tariffs) from this condition, while the requirement of balanced trade at the set of world prices under
the proposed tariffs is used to eliminate trade in the numeraire good under the proposed tariffs from this
condition. With this, the reciprocity condition takes the form given in the text.
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in a way that keeps each government's welfare unaffected by the world price changes. Hence,
in seeking a balance of concessions, governments seek reciprocal tariff reductions from their
trading partners that will neutralize the world-price effects of their own liberalization.
With a balance of concessions now defined, we examine the liberalization paths that
governments might follow in moving from the Nash equilibrium to an efficient trade agreement.
Given the symmetry of the model, it is natural to consider the class of symmetric liberalization
paths along which rx = %y = -% and %y = TX B re. An important point is that any liberalization
path within this class delivers the balance of concessions demanded under reciprocity. To see
this, note that import volume may be written as M(i) = (l-6i)/7 = M*(i), where i = rm - Te,
while world prices satisfy Px(Tm, Te) = /?y(-%, re). Thus, as liberalization occurs from the Nash
equilibrium and the net tariff i is reduced, import and export volumes increase in equal amounts
and the world prices adjust (if at all) in equal amounts as well.
The liberalization process can be further understood with reference to Figure 4. There,
we depict Nash trade policies (1%, i%) by the point labeled N and politically optimal trade
policies (T^,^) by the point labeled PO under the assumption that export interests are
sufficiently powerful to secure an export subsidy in the Nash equilibrium.19 Figure 4 also
depicts iso-efficiency loci through both the Nash and politically optimal points. Each iso-
efficiency locus gives combinations of -% and xe that hold 1 - and thus joint welfare J(i^rm-Te)
- constant. We label the iso-efficiency line through PO (N) by LE-*LE (LN->LN).
Starting from the Nash equilibrium, an efficient symmetric reciprocal trade agreement
will call for the symmetric liberalization of net trade impediments (a reduction in t) in order to
move the world from point N in Figure 4 to a point (any point) on the iso-efficiency line
LE->IE. 2 0 It is direct from the definition of i^and the concavity of J(i) that joint welfare (and the
welfare of each government) increases monotonically from the Nash equilibrium as 1 falls to iE.
This liberalization process achieves Pareto improvements by "undoing" the effects of the terms-
of-trade motivations that caused the initial discrepancy between the Nash and efficient policies.
19It can be shown that the Nash import tariff (export subsidy) is greater (less) than the politically optimal
import tariff (export subsidy). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.
20Symmetry across countries, products and trade policies ensures that movements along the iso-efficiency line,
which by definition hold fixed the local prices in each country, will alter world prices in such a way as to leave
each government's overall welfare unchanged.
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Thus, consistent with Krugman's (1991) three rules of "enlightened mercantilism," we
find that: (1). Governments enter into negotiations seeking more open export markets
("exports are good"), because gaining market access abroad represents a less costly way to help
export interests than a unilateral increase in the export subsidy above the best-response value
(which would result in a terms-of-trade loss); (2). Import liberalization is viewed by
governments as a concession ("imports are bad"), because it implies reducing the import tariff
below the best-response value (and giving up the associated terms-of-trade benefits); and (3).
Each government benefits from a concession at home that is balanced against an "equivalent"
concession abroad ("other things equal, an equal increase in imports and exports is good"),
because the balance of concessions so achieved serves to neutralize the terms-of-trade decline
that would have made unilateral liberalization undesirable. The mercantilist nature of
international trade negotiations is therefore readily explained within our framework. The
explanation for this behavior reflects the desire of governments, whatever their political
preferences, to escape from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma.
B. Article XXVIII
We consider next the specific representation of reciprocity that is found within GATT.
As discussed above, while reciprocity may be a desired outcome of negotiators, GATT does not
require reciprocity in negotiating rounds (GATT Article XXVIII bis; Dam, 1970, pp. 58-59;
Jackson, 1989, p. 123). However, once negotiations are concluded and tariff bindings are set,
GATT does limit countries to abide by reciprocity in the event that a country withdraws or
modifies a previously negotiated concession (tariff binding), which it is essentially free to do at
any time (GATT Article XXVIII; Dam, 1970, pp. 79-99; Jackson, 1989, p. 119). Hence,
rather than a requirement that the outcomes of negotiations conform to reciprocity, GATT
imposes reciprocity in a more indirect way: Whatever the outcome of negotiations, any country
is permitted to raise its tariffs in the future and thereby reduce import volumes, in the
knowledge that its trading partners will be entitled to respond by withdrawing substantially
equivalent concessions of their own.21 An important issue is whether GATT's embodiment of
reciprocity restricts the kinds of trade agreements that can be implemented.
2 1
 Article XXVTII renegotiations require that the negotiating parties "endeavor to maintain a general level of
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favorable to trade than that provided for in this
Agreement." (GATT Article XXVIII:2) However, Article XXVIII renegotiations need not result in agreement,
in which case "...the applicant is free to carry out the proposed changes. Both negotiating and consulted
21
To explore this issue, we must formalize what is meant by substantially equivalent
concessions. As with the notion of balanced concessions, GATT does not provide a precise
definition of substantially equivalent concessions for the purpose of withdrawal, but we will
say that, if a country proposes to increase a previously negotiated tariff, a proposed set of tariff
increases by its trading partner will constitute a withdrawal of substantially equivalent
concessions provided that, when evaluated at the original world prices, the proposed tariff
increases together bring about equal reductions in the volume of each country's imports and
exports.22 Given a previously negotiated set of tariffs {^TI.T'J,^*}, a proposed set of
renegotiated tariffs {T%, xl, %X2, r*J} will represent an initial tariff withdrawal by one country and
a withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions by its trading partner provided that
Once again, inspection of the welfare functions reveals that this condition is satisfied by any set
of tariff increases that (i). leaves world prices unchanged, or (ii). alters world prices in a way
that keeps each government's welfare unaffected by the world price changes. Thus, reciprocity
ensures that any renegotiation will be over the set of outcomes which are feasible under the
world prices that were established in the original negotiations.
Effectively, then, the representation of reciprocity in GATT implies that, when
governments negotiate tariff bindings, they are really negotiating a set of world prices upon
which, in the event of future tariff increases by any one country, reciprocal tariff increases by
its trading partners will be gauged. We formalize this representation of reciprocity in the
following Bilateral Negotiation Game applied to each good:
Stage 1: Governments bargain over the world price.
Stage 2: Each government announces a tariff pair consisting of a tarifflevel for
itself and that implied for its trading partner by the world price from
stage 1.
Stage 3: If each government announces the same tariff pair in stage 2, then this
tariff pair is implemented as the outcome of the negotiation. If
governments announce different tariff pairs in stage 2, then the most-
restrictive tariff pair is implemented.
contracting partners are correspondingly free to withdraw 'substantially equivalent concessions.'" (Dam, 1970,
p.86).
22Dam (1970, pp. 87-91) provides an interpretation of GATT's definition of substantially equivalent concessions
that is broadly consistent with our approach.
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This game allows each government to "renegotiate" to a new trade-policy pair, provided that the
pair generates the same world price that arose in the first stage.23 As our interest lies in the set
of trade policy outcomes that can be achieved under the representation of reciprocity given in
stages 2 and 3, we do not offer a formal description of the stage-1 bargaining process.24
In light of the symmetry of the model, we again consider the class of symmetric tariffs
(rx = Ty s rm and Ty = rx = Te) and the corresponding symmetric world price (p™ = py = pw).
We will say that a tariff pair {fm, te} can be implemented under reciprocity if there exists apw
such that any Nash equilibrium of the subgame corresponding to stages 2 and 3 of the Bilateral
Negotiation Game yields the outcome { rm, re} when/?"' is selected in stage 1.
We first state a property of any tariff pair that can be implemented under reciprocity:
Proposition 3: A tariff pair can be implemented under reciprocity if and only if it satisfies
either {Wpx=O, Wp*=0, wfezO, Wpyz0} or {Wpy=O, Wp*=O, Wp*<;0, Wpx*O}.
Proof: The government that announces the binding (i.e., most-restrictive) tariff pair in stage 2
must select the tariff pair that maximizes the value of its objectives given the world price
determined in stage 1. Thus, if fTm,Tg/ corresponds to the importing (exporting)
government's announced tariff pair, then (i). {tm, Tg/ must satisfy Wpx = 0 = Wp* (Wp = 0
= Wp*), and (ii). {Tm,xe} must be no less restrictive than the exporting (importing)
government's announced tariff pair, implying thatf rm, fe} must satisfy Wp* z 0 and Wp z> 0
(Wp* <; 0 and Wpx <z 0) as well. Q.E.D.
2 3By the most-restrictive tariff pair, we mean the tariff pair that leads to the least trade volume. In specifying
the Bilateral Negotiation Game, we restrict attention to tariff renegotiations that satisfy the definition of
reciprocity by keeping the world price fixed. This involves no formal loss of generality. Consider any tariff pair
A consistent with the definition of reciprocity that a government might announce that induces a different world
price. Then there exists another tariff pair B that induces the same local price and preserves the original world
price. The two tariff pairs induce the same trade volumes and the same government welfares, and so the
government would achieve the same welfare outcome by announcing tariff pair B instead of tariff pair A.
2 4We think of Stage 1 of the Bilateral Negotiation Game as representing a round of tariff negotiations under
Article XXVIII bis, and Stage 2 as the ensuing Article XXVIII renegotiation. Note that nothing "happens"
between stages one and two (i.e., no "shock," no new information), and that this is consistent with the fact that
no justification need be given for renegotiation under Article XXVIII. GATT also provides for the temporary
suspension of tariff commitments under Article XIX, and authorizes trading partners to temporarily suspend
"substantially equivalent concessions" of their own. However, unlike Article XXVIII, recourse to Article XIX
requires that a country establish injury as a result of "unforeseen developments" in the presence of the concession
it seeks to suspend (Dam, 1970, p. 101).
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Proposition 3 says that a tariff pair can be implemented under reciprocity if and only if, when
faced with the fixed world prices implied by that tariff pair, at least one government is content
with the volume of trade and no government wants reduced trade volume.
We are now prepared to determine whether efficient trade agreements can be
implemented under reciprocity, and if so, the form that these agreements take. Our results are
contained in the next proposition:
Proposition 4: An efficient trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity if and only
it is characterized by tariffs which are set at their politically optimal levels.
Proof: An efficient agreement is on the locus defined by (8) as Wpx + Wfy* I Xx - 0, with the
symmetric condition holding as well for good v. By Proposition 3, a tariff pair can be
implemented under reciprocity if and only if it satisfies either {W&x=0, W**=0, W**^0,
Wf,yz:O} or {Wpy=O, Wp*=O, Wp*<;0, Wpx<;0}. It thus follows that an efficient trade
agreement can be implemented under reciprocity if and only if it satisfies W^x=O=W^* and
W* =0=Wp*. But this is by (9) the definition of politically optimal tariffs. Q.E.D.
Hence, our framework can provide a logic to the representation of reciprocity found in GATT,
but only if governments seek through GATT to implement the tariffs that remain when the
terms-of-trade motivations from each government's Nash trade policies are eliminated: No
other efficient set of tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity.25
The main ideas are illustrated in Figure 5. This figure depicts the iso-efficiency line
through the Nash point (labeled LN->LN), the iso-efficiency line through the politically optimal
point (i.e., the efficiency locus, labeled IF->IF), and iso-welfare contours for the importing and
exporting government. At a political optimum (labeled PO in the figure), these iso-welfare
contours are tangent to each other and to a world price line (labeled p^,) and the corresponding
tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity. At a point on the efficiency locus such as that
labeled H (L), the iso-welfare contours are again tangent to each other but now the iso-world-
25Terms-of-trade motivations lead all governments to protect against imports too readily and to promote exports
too timidly relative to the efficient levels of intervention given their preferences. Hence, Proposition 4 implies
that import tariffs will be reduced in an efficient trade agreement that is implemented under reciprocity, but that
export subsidies should be encouraged. This suggests that GATT's attempt to restrict export subsidies may be
misplaced, since such attempts work against the basic task of expanding trade volumes from inefficiently low
levels. In fact, the treatment of subsidies in GATT has long been a source of controversy and confusion. GATT
originally contained no rules on the use of export subsidies, and then later introduced and repeatedly tightened its
rules on allowable export subsidies and on subsidies more broadly (Jackson, 1989, pp. 249-273). For an
analysis of the treatment of export subsidies in international trade agreements, see Bagwell and Staiger (1996b).
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price line through this point is steeper (flatter) than their common tangency. The tariffs
associated with point H (L) are not politically optimal, and they cannot be implemented under
reciprocity as the importing (exporting) government will desire less liberalization than is
required to reach the efficiency locus along this world price line.26
We have now provided an answer to our second question, finding that the principle of
reciprocity serves to "undo" the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume that occur
when governments pursue unilateral trade policies. In this way, reciprocity acts as a principle
that guides member governments to a more efficient outcome. We turn next to our third and
fourth questions and consider the principle of non-discrimination and preferential agreements.
IV. Reciprocal Trade Agreements in a Many-Country Framework
We now extend the two-country model of the previous section to a many-country
setting. We continue to assume that there is a single home country (no *), but we now allow
the home country to import good x from three separate foreign sources (*1,*2,*3). For
simplicity, we focus on trade among the four countries in good x alone.
A. Model
In this subsection, we present our basic assumptions, determine the market-clearing
prices and trade volumes, and define the government welfare functions.
Basic Assumptions: The good x is produced and demanded in each of the four
countries, but the demand and supply functions are such that the domestic country is a natural
importer of good x while the three foreign countries are natural exporters of this good. Letting
p denote the local price of x in the domestic market, the domestic demand and supply functions
are respectively represented with the functions D(p) and Q(p). We assume that the three foreign
countries are symmetric. Denoting the local price of good x in foreign country j as p J, the
corresponding demand and supply in foreign country j are given as D (p J) and Q (p J). We
represent the domestic import volume as M(p) = D(p) - Q(p), while the export volume of
26While we do not specify the bargaining environment in the first stage of the Bilateral Negotiation Game, it is
immediate that any first-stage bargaining structure that yields an efficient outcome to the Bilateral Negotiation
Game must implement politically optimal tariffs. For instance, it can be shown that if the Generalized Nash
Bargaining solution is applied to the first stage of the Bilateral Negotiation Game, politically optimal tariffs will
be the unique outcome provided that (i). international lump-sum transfers are feasible, or (ii). bargaining power
is sufficiently balanced across governments.
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foreign country j is denoted as E*(p*J) = Q*(p*J) - D*(p*J). Finally, the respective profit
functions are given as TI(p) and lf(p*J).
While we describe our main findings in general terms, it is sometimes convenient to
refer to a concrete version of the model. To this end, we assume that D(p) = 1-p, Q(p) = p/2,
D*(p*J) = (l-p*J)/3 and Q*(p*J) = p*V3, from which it follows that M(p) = l-3p/2, E*(p*J) =
[2p*J-l]/3, n(p) = (p)2/4 and lf(p*J) = (p*J)2/6.
Price Determination: Let TJ denote the specific import tariff on home imports of x from
foreign country j , and let r*J similarly denote the specific export subsidy on exports of x from
foreign country/ Provided that trade taxes do not prohibit trade, the local prices must obey the
following arbitrage and market-clearing conditions:
p = p J' + TJ' - T J
The market-clearing prices again depend upon the net tariffs. Letting U = %J - %J denote the net
tariff between the domestic country and foreign country y, we may thus represent the market-
clearing local prices as p(i1, L2, L3) and p*i(il, i2, i3). The domestic market-clearing local price,
pit1, i2, i3), is increasing in each argument, while the foreign market-clearing local price,
p^Hi1, i2, i3), is decreasing in iJ and increasing in its other arguments.
Turning now to the world price, we begin with the observation that each bilateral trading
relationship is associated with its own "world" price. Letting pwJ denote the world (untaxed)
price of x between the home country and foreign country y, we have that the world price
satisfies p = pWJ + TJ and p J = pWJ + TJ. Using the solutions for the market-clearing local
prices, we may express the world price as pwJ(rJ, i1, i2, i3).21 This function is decreasing in its
first argument and increasing in all of its other arguments. Market-clearing local prices also
may be expressed as functions of world prices: p(TJ,pwJ(rJ, i1, i2, i3) ) = pwJ(rJ, i1, i2, i3) + z-i
and p*J(rJ,pwJ(TJ, i1, i2, L3) ) = pwJ(rJ, i1, i2, i3) + T*J. Finally, we observe that if domestic
tariffs conform to MFN, then T1 = T2 = T3 = rand therefore a single world price obtains with
pwl =pw2 =pw3 =pw
27Explicit solutions for the various prices can be found in the Appendix.
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Trade Volumes: With the market-clearing local and world prices now determined, it is
possible to provide the condition under which the market-clearing trade volumes are positive.
Exploiting the specific structure of the model, it can be shown that trade policies are non-
prohibitive provided that
3
rf < (4/7) [1/8 + S CB], for'] = 1,2,3.
Thus, trade volumes are positive provided that the net tariffs are not too high.
Government Objectives: As in the previous section, governments are assumed to
maximize a weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue. Since
each foreign country trades only with the home country, the objectives of each foreign country
can be written as a function of its local price and the world price between it and the home
country. Specifically, the welfare function for the government of foreign country j is
1
*J(p*J,pwJ) m fD(p*J)dp*J + ijfffi) - [p*J - pwJ]E*(p*J).
Notice that the political-economy weight placed upon the export sector may differ across the
foreign governments.
While the foreign-government welfare functions are similar to those derived in the
previous section, the home government now faces three trading partners against which it can
discriminate, and so its welfare function is more complicated. The home-government welfare
function is defined as
1 3
W&pWW3^1^2^3) - p(p)dp + ymWp) + 2[P - PWJ] E*<P*J)-
P J=l
Observe that the home-government welfare function depends upon the home local price, the
world prices and the foreign local prices.
The welfare functions reveal an interesting pattern of externalities. As before,
externalities pass between countries through the corresponding world prices. Now, however,
there is an additional externality channel through which a foreign tariff can affect home welfare.
For any fixed volume of imports (i.e., for any fixed home price), the home government prefers
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that more of the given import volume is allocated to the foreign country against which it has the
highest tariff. Thus, foreign local prices, which determine foreign export flows, exert a
separate externality on home welfare, even when the local home and world prices are fixed.
Notice that this local price externality is removed when the home government adopts non-
discriminatory tariffs, in which case home tariff revenue can be expressed simply as a function
of the home local price and the single world price (i.e., as [p -pw]M(p)).
The home welfare function also can be written as a function of the home local price and
a composite variable, T = T(p*1,p*2,p*3,pwl,pw2,pw3), that represents the home country's
multilateral terms of trade. To this end, we define T as a weighted average of the world prices
that the home country faces:
) x pwi
It is now direct to verify that home welfare may be re-written as
1
Thus, externalities associated with foreign tariffs travel through the foreign local and world
prices to the home multilateral terms of trade, T, and from there to home welfare. Note that T =
pw under MFN tariffs for the home country, confirming that the world price is then the only
channel through which externalities flow to the home country.
B . Nash Equilibria
As in the previous section, we start by considering the static tariff game, in which the
domestic government selects a tariff policy, (T1, T2, T3), in order to maximize its welfare, W, at
the same time that each foreign government j chooses its tariff policy, W, to maximize its
welfare, W*J. Having offered a thorough interpretation of the Nash equilibrium in the previous
section, we simply present here the general best-response conditions that Nash trade policies
must satisfy. We also focus only on interior Nash equilibria in which trade takes place.
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Maximizing W with respect to xJ and W J with respect to x J for eachy defines implicitly
the domestic- and foreign-government best-response tariffs:
(10a). Home: Wp + VWf- = 0, forj = 1,2,3
(10b). Foreign: Wpij + Tj W*lj = 0, forj = 1,2,3,
where Vm [dt7dxJJI [dp/dxJJ and Tj * [dpwJ/dx*J]/ [dp*J/dx*J]. Note that it is only the home
government's concern over the world price effects of its intervention that lead it to discriminate
against its foreign trading partners: any local price achieved under discriminatory tariffs could
also be achieved under an MFN tariff that allows the same multilateral import volume. In
particular, since dp/dx-J is constant and identical across y in our linear model, it follows that the
home government's best-response tariffs are set so as to equate their marginal effects on the
home-country's terms of trade {dTldi — dT/dx* for (i,k}=l,2,3), thereby achieving maximal
terms-of-trade improvement for any local price through tariff intervention. From the implicit
equations given in (10a) and (10b), it is straightforward to solve for the six Nash tariffs that
arise when each government selects a best-response tariff.
C. Reciprocal Trade Agreements
We next characterize the tariff combinations that maximize joint welfare. A general
perspective can be offered with reference to the tariff that the home country places on imports
from foreign country j . The efficiency condition that this tariff must satisfy is given by
db df v» *i db*1 *i dDwi
TT7" W'fS TXT" t*"-*- ^ f v v r **• \ArlS TT7 C*X/ -^  «
Ct\? CtJ? l=zl ClXr ClXr
To interpret this condition further, we recall that the home tariff affects the multilateral terms of
trade through its effect on world prices and local foreign prices:
i
H
 dj + dwidv 1=1 dp l av dpy
Using Wf = - M(p), dT/dpwi = E*(pn)/M(p) and W*^ = E*(p), it is now direct to see that the
efficiency condition can be written as
i=ldpl
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Notice that the world price movements are again eliminated from the efficiency condition.
Comparing efficiency condition (11) with the best-response conditions (10a) and (10b), we see
that Nash tariffs are once more inefficient, since the selection of these tariffs is motivated by the
consequent movements in the world prices.
The novel feature of the multi-country model concerns the connection between the local
foreign price and the home-country multilateral terms of trade. This local-price externality
corresponds to the second term in (11). If home tariffs are discriminatory, so that the
multilateral terms of trade depends upon local foreign and world prices, then this local-price
externality is non-zero. Let us again define politically optimal tariffs as the tariffs that would be
attained if the terms-of-trade motivations from each government's Nash trade policy choices
were eliminated. In the present model, these tariffs are implicitly defined by
(12). Wp = 0 = Wgij, forj = 1,2,3.
Returning now to the efficiency condition (11) above and using (12), we see that politically
optimal tariffs are inefficient when the home tariffs are discriminatory. Intuitively, even if the
foreign governments are not motivated by the world-price consequences of their trade policy
choices, the local prices that their tariffs imply determine foreign export volumes and thereby
impose an externality upon the home government if its tariffs are discriminatory.
On the other hand, if home tariffs satisfy MFN, then the multilateral terms of trade is
simply the (common) world price, and the local-price-externality term in (11) is zero. It follows
that a multilateral trade agreement is efficient if the terms-of-trade motivations are eliminated
from each government's Nash tariff selection and all tariffs conform to MFN. In other words,
politically optimal tariffs that also satisfy MFN are efficient, but politically optimal tariffs that
are discriminatory are inefficient.28 The central idea is that, under MFN, externalities are
channeled only through the world price, and so efficiency is achieved if terms-of-trade
motivations are eliminated from each government's Nash trade policy choices.
28The requirement of political optimality as given in (12) represents four restrictions placed on a total of six
tariffs. Thus, there will be many politically optimal tariff combinations. When tariffs are required to satisfy
MFN, then there are only four tariffs in total, and so among the set of politically optimal tariffs there is a unique
combination of tariffs that are also MFN.
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V. Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements
Having characterized the Nash, efficient and politically optimal trade policies in our
many-country framework, we now use this framework in order to evaluate the principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination in a multilateral trade agreement. We also assess the
implications of preferential agreements for a multilateral trading system built upon these
principles. We begin by exploring the link between reciprocity and non-discrimination.
A. Reciprocity and Non-discrimination
We are again interested in characterizing the conditions under which an efficient
multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity. We thus now extend to the
multi-country setting the definition of substantially equivalent concessions. We will say that, if
a country proposes to increase a previously negotiated tariff, a proposed set of tariff increases
by its trading partner(s) will constitute a withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions
provided that, when valued at existing world prices, the proposed tariff increases together bring
about equal reductions in the volume of each country's imports and exports. Given a
previously negotiated set of tariffs, {¥,7f,i^,'f1,^2,'f3}, a proposed set of renegotiated
tariffs, {T1, T2, T3, T*1, T*2, T*3}, will represent an initial tariff withdrawal by one country and a
withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions by its trading partner(s) provided that
[PwJ(TJ,r1,r2,r3)-pwJ(TJ,l1,l2,l3)]E*(p*J(l1,i2,i3)) = 0,/orj = 1,2,3.
This condition is satisfied by any set of tariff increases that leaves world prices unchanged.29
Therefore, as in the two-country setting of the previous section, reciprocity ensures that any
renegotiation will be over the set of outcomes which are feasible under the world prices that
were established in the original negotiations.
We therefore extend the Bilateral Negotiation Game of the previous section to our multi -
country model. Formally, we define the Multilateral Negotiation Game as follows:
29This condition can be derived with the same steps described in footnote 18, where the numeraire good z again
ensures that trade is balanced. The presence of a single non-numeraire good in our multi-country model accounts
for the slightly stronger condition defining the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions as compared to
the condition derived above for the two-country model. In either case, renegotiation takes place over the same set
of outcomes: those that are feasible under the world prices that were established in the original negotiations.
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Stage 1: Governments bargain over the set of bilateral world prices.
Stage 2: Each government announces a set of tariffs consisting of tariff levels for
itself and tariff levels for the remaining three countries that together yield
the set of bilateral world prices from stage 1.
Stage 3: If each government announces the same set of tariffs in stage 2, then this
set of tariffs is implemented as the outcome of the negotiation. If the set
of tariffs announced by any government in stage 2 differs from that
announced by any other, then countries implement the set of tariffs
which achieves the maximum trade volume subject to the constraint that
no country engages in more (multilateral) trade than was implied by its
announcement.
In analogy with the two-country model of the previous section, we will say that a set of tariffs
{T1,!?,!?,!?1,!?2,!?3} can be implemented under reciprocity if there exists a set of bilateral
world prices {pwl,pw2,pw3} such that any Nash equilibrium of the subgame corresponding to
stages 2 and 3 of the Multilateral Negotiation Game yields the outcome {¥, T2, T?, t*1, r*2, r*3}
when {pwl,pw^,pw3} is selected in stage 1.
It can be shown that the analog to Proposition 3 holds in our multi-country setting. We
state it here in terms of our multi-country notation for completeness:
Proposition 5: A set of tariffs {it, t2, t5, t*7, r*2, t*3} can be implemented under reciprocity
if and only if it satisfies either {W*=0; Wpij^Ofor each)} or {W^O; w£*j=Ofor each]}.
We now determine whether an efficient agreement can be implemented under reciprocity in the
presence of tariff discrimination. Our result is contained in the next proposition:
Proposition 6: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity
if and only if it is characterized by tariffs which conform to the principle of MFN and are
politically optimal.
Looking to Proposition 5 and (11), it is clear that a set of tariffs that is politically optimal and
that satisfies MFN can be implemented under reciprocity and is efficient. In the Appendix, we
show that the reverse implication holds as well.
The broader idea is that the principle of reciprocity serves well as a means to promote
efficient agreements when externalities travel only through the world price. When governments
abide by the principle of MFN, externalities indeed do travel in only this fashion, and so
reciprocity and non-discrimination work in concert as principles that guide governments to
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efficient trade agreements. In response to our third question, this explains why the principle of
non-discrimination can advance the mutual goals of member governments that participate in a
multilateral trading agreement that also endorses the principle of reciprocity. We now develop
an analysis of preferential agreements in order to address our final question.
B . Preferential Agreements
We consider two forms of preferential agreements. We will say that the home country
forms a free trade area with foreign country i if T*' = r l = 0 and ri > 0 for some j * i. The
feature of a customs union that distinguishes it from a free trade area is that, in addition to
eliminating internal barriers, the members of a customs union adopt a common external tariff
policy as well. Hence, the tariff decisions of customs union members are centralized, and so
the objectives of the tariff authorities in the customs union must be defined. If the home
country forms a customs union with foreign country i, we define the objectives of the customs
union as the sum of the objectives of its members: U*i = W + W*K
Consider first the introduction of free trade agreements. In particular, suppose that the
home government establishes a free trade agreement with foreign country i. We may now
express an immediate implication of Proposition 6:
Proposition 7: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can not be implemented under
reciprocity in the presence of a free trade agreement.
Proposition 7 indicates that free trade agreements are fundamentally at odds with a multilateral
system that is built on the pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination: The legitimacy of the
principle of reciprocity at the multilateral level is undermined if exceptions from the principle of
MFN are granted for the formation of free trade agreements. Intuitively, the politically optimal
tariffs are efficient when externalities travel only through world prices, but externalities travel
through local prices as well when tariffs are discriminatory (as when some countries form a free
trade agreement). The efficiency properties of politically optimal MFN external tariffs are thus
lost when a free trade agreement is in place.
We next consider the formation of a customs union between the home country and
foreign country i. We can not immediately conclude from Proposition 6 that the presence of a
customs union is incompatible with the pursuit of an efficient multilateral trade agreement
through the principle of reciprocity. This is because the situation in which a customs union
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exists represents a different modeling environment than considered above, as the number of
policy-setting countries has been reduced from four to three. Nevertheless, Proposition 6 is
instructive. Suppose that two countries that form a customs union are symmetric and that they
eliminate the internal tariff for trade within the union. Then, in a sense, the union is analogous
to a single country in the analysis above, suggesting that the principle of reciprocity can then
deliver an efficient agreement in the presence of a customs union if and only if all external tariffs
satisfy MFN and are politically optimal.
To explore this idea, we require a notion of symmetry. Observe that if the home
country and foreign country i remove internal tariffs (i.e., if T* = r*1 = 0), then there must be a
common price within the union (i.e., p = p *'). Not surprisingly, a common local price within
the union is inefficient unless the home import-competing and foreign-country-/ exporting firms
have political weights that are in some sense symmetric. In the Appendix, we exploit the
specific structure of our model and demonstrate that the common local price that results from a
removal of internal barriers is internally inefficient unless the weights satisfy the following
relationship: 3fe - 2ym - 1. When this relationship holds, we say that the domestic country is
a naturalintegration partnerwith foreign country i, as the removal of internal trade barriers is
then internally efficient.
We can now state:
Proposition 8: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity
in the presence of a customs union if and only if the members of the customs union are natural
integration partners and the external tariffs of the customs union and the tariffs of all other
countries conform to the principle of MFN and are politically optimal.
The proof of this proposition is found in the Appendix. Proposition 8 establishes that
preferential agreements can be part of an efficient multilateral system that is based on
reciprocity, but both the form of the preferential agreement and the circumstances under which it
is appropriate are quite special. Thus, with respect to our fourth question, our framework
offers only limited support for the view that preferential agreements are compatible with the
efficient functioning of a multilateral system founded on reciprocity.
We summarize the results of this section with a final proposition:
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Proposition 9: An efficient multilateral trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity
in the presence of a preferential agreement if and only if the multilateral agreement is
characterized as follows:
(i). Each country that is not a member of a preferential agreement must abide by the principle of
non-discrimination (MFN) and set its tariffs at a level which is politically optimal; and
(ii). Each country that is a member of a preferential agreement must belong to a customs union
between natural integration partners that sets its external tariffs in accordance with the principle
of non-discrimination (MFN) and at a level which is politically optimal for the customs union.
VI. Conclusion
We began this paper with four questions. First, what can governments hope to
accomplish with reciprocal trade agreements? Second, given that free trade is not their stated
objective, can governments nevertheless expect an arrangement that advocates reciprocal tariff
liberalization to be mutually advantageous? Third, are their mutual goals best advanced by an
agreement that eliminates discriminatory treatment? And fourth, once the principle of non-
discrimination is adopted, can exceptions to this principle be granted for the creation of
preferential agreements without compromising the performance of the multilateral system?
Allowing that governments may have both political and economic motivations, we argue
that the appeal of a reciprocal trade agreement rests on the elimination of the inefficiency
associated with the terms-of-trade externality that arises when governments set their policies
unilaterally. This externality induces governments to restrict trade more than is efficient, given
their preferences. Arguing from this perspective, we find that the representation of reciprocity
as found in GATT can enable governments to expand trade and achieve an efficient outcome.
This is true, however, only if governments seek through GATT to implement the tariffs that are
desired when the terms-of-trade motivations from each government's Nash trade policy choices
are eliminated. In particular, we find that an efficient trade agreement can be implemented under
reciprocity only if the agreement is characterized by such tariffs. We also discover a new link
between the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN) in an efficient multilateral
trading system: A multilateral system built on the principle of reciprocity can implement an
efficient agreement only if it also embraces the principle of non-discrimination.
With regard to preferential trading arrangements, an important departure of our focus
from other work on the relationship between regionalism and the world trading system is that
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we do not analyze whether regionalism serves as a means to enable GATT to bring the world
closer to free trade. Instead, our analysis takes a positive approach to the issue of regionalism
within GATT, and we analyze whether GATT serves the interests of its member governments
when it allows under Article XXIV exceptions to the principle of MFN for the purpose of
creating preferential agreements. Our analysis suggests that the circumstances under which a
preferential agreement can arise as part of an efficient agreement are limited. Preferential
agreements can be part of an efficient multilateral system that is based on reciprocity, but both
the form and the circumstances under which it is appropriate are quite special. The efficiency
properties of a multilateral system based on reciprocity can be preserved when a preferential
agreement is allowed only if the member countries are "natural integration partners" that seek to
integrate fully by forming a customs union.
Fundamentally, our theory rests upon the hypotheses that governments care about the
terms of trade and that they are able to influence the terms of trade with their trade policy
choices. The former hypothesis demands that the terms-of-trade effects of trade policy choices
influence the national cost of intervention in quantitatively important ways. In this regard,
empirical studies by Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1994) offer strong
support. These studies estimate the impacts of voluntary export restraints (VERs) imposed by
the U.S. on Japanese automobiles in the 1980's. Both studies indicate that the terms-of-trade
implications of the U.S. decision to restrict automobile imports from Japan with VERs (rather
than with tariffs) increased by a substantial amount the cost to the U.S. of achieving the reduced
import volumes. For example, comparing the actual VER policy with a hypothetical equivalent-
tariff policy - the difference reflecting the distinct world (untaxed) prices associated with each
form of intervention - Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1994) calculate that the equivalent-tariff
policy would have yielded revenue sufficient to turn what was a losing trade policy from the
perspective of U.S. national income into a policy that would have generated a net gain to U.S.
national income of $12.5 billion. It is precisely this role of world prices to affect the
international incidence of the cost of intervention that is the starting point of our theory.30
30Our theory allows that a government might choose to offer protection even when the policy generates losses
from a purely national income perspective, as the U.S. VERs against Japan evidently did, but it might be
tempting to conclude that the "give-away" implicit in the U.S. choice to proceed with VERs rather than an
equivalent-tariff policy suggests in fact that the U.S. did not care about terms-of-trade effects in this case. It
must be remembered, however, that VERs represent a cooperative, negotiated approach to restricting trade, and
that the U.S. "give-away" associated with its VERs was in fact in return for something from Japan: An
understanding that Japan would not retaliate with trade restrictions of its own against U.S. imports. Therefore,
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It is also important to mention that additional empirical evidence exists in support of the
latter hypothesis.31 Ultimately, an importing country has power over the terms of trade if
foreign exporters incur some of the incidence of an import tariff (i.e., the full tariff is not passed
through to domestic consumers). In this regard, we note that a large empirical literature exists
that documents imperfect pass-through in the face of exchange rate shocks. It is thus natural to
suppose that imperfect pass-through would also arise when the cost increase takes the form a
tariff increase, and indeed Feenstra (1995) offers some empirical support for this supposition.
Finally, we call attention to two caveats that are associated with our analysis. First, we
have examined reciprocity and non-discrimination as principles that guide governments from
inefficient unilateral outcomes to the efficiency frontier. We have not considered here the
possibility that factors may arise that prevent governments from reaching this frontier. A case
of particular interest is where enforcement issues at the multilateral level (see, e.g., Dam, 1970)
preclude governments from eliminating fully the terms-of-trade motivations from their trade
policy choices under MFN. In such circumstances, the granting of exceptions to MFN for
those country pairs that have additional enforcement ability to move further toward the
efficiency frontier could enhance the overall efficiency of the multilateral agreement. As we
show in other work (Bagwell and Staiger, forthcoming c), however, the enforcement
implications of regional agreements for multilateral cooperation are complex, and there is as yet
no basis from which to presume that such agreements necessarily enhance the overall efficiency
of the multilateral agreement.32
the relevant policy alternative for the U.S. was not a set of unilateral tariff increases, which would surely have
triggered a retaliatory "trade war" with Japan, but rather tariff changes that are consistent with the rules of GATT.
In fact, one way to interpret the use of VERs is that, by giving away the tariff revenue and thereby ensuring that
the importing government does not enjoy any terms-of-trade benefits as a by-product of its demand for reduced
import volumes, these policy tools become an imperfect way of preventing cost-shifting motives from driving
trade policy choices, and in this way substitute for the cooperative outcomes that GATT would have achievedhad
import tariffs been renegotiated under Article XXVIII (or temporarily raised under Article XIX).
3
 * Support also can be found in the theoretical analysis of Gros (1987), who finds that even ostensibly small
countries have some power over the terms of trade, if the industry is monopolistically competitive. We also
note that our theory does not require that all countries have power to affect the world prices. Rather, our theory
predicts that truly "small" countries would be extended MFN treatment in GATT but would not be required to
offer reciprocal liberalization of their own, as their unilateral trade policy decisions are not influenced by
inefficient cost-shifting motives (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1996a). This is, to some extent, what is
accomplished in GATT through the "principle supplier" rule (see, for example, Dam, 1970, p. 61).
3 2Other papers that consider the implications of allowing regional agreements for the ability to enforce
multilateral cooperation include Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming a, b), Bond and Syropolous (1996a,b) and
Bond, Syropolous and Winters (1996). A broad perspective of the role of enforcement in multilateral trading
arrangements is developed by Maggi (1996).
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Second, the government objective function that we have adopted throughout our
analysis, while representative of the leading formulations of political-economy of trade policy,
nevertheless may be too narrowly defined to capture many of the reasons that governments
pursue preferential agreements in practice. In fact, regional integration initiatives are likely to
reflect broader non-economic objectives such as military security or political stability that are not
reflected in a country's national prices or terms of trade. Under this interpretation, GATT's
willingness to allow Article XXIV exceptions may be rationalized in terms of broader non-
economic objectives that can be served by deeper integration among a subset of GATT
members. In future work, we plan to explore the consequences of such government
preferences for the role of preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system.
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Appendix
We prove here Propositions 6 and 8. We begin by reporting various calculations for the
many-country model:
3
pit1, i2, i3) = (4/7)fl + 2 ill3]
i-1
3
p^t1, i2, i3) = (4/7)[l + Z ii/3] - iK forj = 1,2,3
i=l
3
pwJ(rJ, i1, i2, i3) = (4/7)[l + 2 il/3] - rl forj = 1,2,3
il
t) = 1/2 - (4 - Yj(p)2l4 - (1 - 3fi/2)T
W*J(p,pwJ) = 1/6 - (3 - i)(P)2/6 + (2p*J - l)pwJ/3, forj = 1,2,3
3




where V = W + 21 W*K Choosing (i1, i2, i3) to maximize V, we find that the efficiency locus is
i=l
characterized as
(A 1). (2/3X4 - yjp = (3 - y[XpH) = (3 - ^ Hp*2) = (3 - Y^XP*3)-
Next, we find that the politically optimal tariffs are defined implicitly by
(A2). W}, = (3/4) [2T- (2/3X4 - ym)p] = 0.
(A3). W$j = (l/3)[2pwJ - (3 - yfjpj] = 0, forj =1,2,3.
Proof of Proposition 6: A comparison of (A2) and (A3) with the conditions of Proposition
5 reveals that politically optimal MFN tariffs can be implemented under reciprocity, while a
comparison of (A2) and (A3) with (Al) reveals that politically optimal MFN tariffs are efficient.
We now show that no other efficient trade agreement can be implemented under reciprocity.
There are three cases to consider:
(i). An agreement that calls for tariffs that are politically optimal but do not conform with
MFN. In this case, T * pwJ forj = 1,2,3 and a comparison of (A2) and (A3) with (Al) implies
that politically optimal tariffs can not be efficient.
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(ii). An agreement that calls for tariffs that conform to MFN but are not politically optimal.
A * ;Then, Proposition 5 implies that either {2pw = (2/3)(4 - ym)p; 2pw ;> (3 - ^e)pJ for each j}, or
{2pw £ (2/3)(4 - ym)p; 2pw = (3 - ytypfi for each]}. If tariffs are not politically optimal, then
by (A2) and (A3) at least one inequality for somey is strict in each case, which by (Al) implies
that the agreement can not be efficient.
(iii). An agreement that calls for tariffs that do not conform to MFN and that are not
politically optimal. Proposition 5 implies that either {2T = (2/3)(4 - ym)p; 2pwJ s> (3 - yijp^for
eachj}, or {2T <; (2/3)(4 - ym)p; 2pwJ = (3 - y>e)p*J for each j}. Let k solve mini {pwi}, and
observe that k is uniquely defined under discriminatory tariffs. Then, either (2/3)(4 - ym)p- 2T
>2pwk z (3 - fyp*k or (2/3)(4 - ym)p > 2T > 2pwk = (3 - fyp*k. Using (Al), we conclude
ym
fyp or (2/3)(4 ym)p > 2T > 2pwk = (3 - fyp*k Using (Al) we
that the agreement can not be efficient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: To begin, we calculate the customs-union objective function:
U*i
 mw+W*' = 2/3 - (4 - ym)(p?l4 - (3 - fe)(pH9/6 - (1 - 3p/2)f + (2pH - l)pwi/3.
Suppose first that the home country and foreign country i are natural integration partners (i.e.,
3y*e - 2ym — 1). This condition is equivalent to (2I3)(4 - ym) — (3 - y*e), and so it follows from
(Al) that the removal of internal trade barriers (which implies p = p*1) is internally efficient.
Suppose further that all external tariffs conform to MFN and are set at their politically optimal
levels. External tariffs then satisfy:
U$ = (S/4)[2pw - (2/3X4 - ym)p] = 0
j = (l/3)[2pw - (3 -
Referring to Proposition 5, we see that politically optimal MFN external tariffs can be
implemented under reciprocity; in addition, we see from (Al) that, in the presence of a customs
union between natural integration partners, politically optimal MFN external tariffs are efficient.
If the customs union members are not natural integration partners, then the elimination
of internal trade barriers will be internally inefficient, and so the efficiency locus can not be
reached. Finally, if the external tariffs are not set at their politically optimal levels in accordance
with MFN, then the efficiency locus can not be reached under reciprocity by the proof of
Proposition 6 (points (i), (ii) and (iii) as applied to external tariffs). Q.E.D.
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